A Conversation on Madhyamaka | Dr. David Higgins & Prof. Jan Westerhoff

A Conversation on Madhyamaka I Title 1: “Intrinsic Emptiness and Extrinsic Emptiness: Three Strains of Compatibilism in the Tibetan Emptiness Debates” The Seventh Karmapa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506) once remarked that the views of intrinsic emptiness (rang stong) and extrinsicb emptiness (gzhan stong) are without contradiction (‘gal med). His comment touches on a leitmotif of the Bka’ brgyud discourses on emptiness that arose in the post-classical period (15th c. onward): the idea that these contrasting views are best regarded as complementary rather than contradictory. My presentation examines three dimensions of this compatibilism: Doxographical compatibilism reconciles the two theories of emptiness and the schools of thought associated with them—gzhan stong was claimed as “Great Madhyamaka” (dbu ma chen po) by proponents like Dol po pa but dismissed as a refuted Cittamātra idealism by detractors, and the rubrics became linked in Tibet to rival sects, rang stong with the Dge lugs and gzhan stong with the Jo nang. Hermeneutical compatibilism coordinates an apophatic orientation (dgag phyogs) that negates any essence among phenomena with a cataphatic orientation (sgrub phyogs) that makes room for positive descriptions of the ultimate. Contemplative compatibilism combines analytical meditation (dpyad sgom), which discerns emptiness by eliminating objects of negation (dgag bya), with resting meditation (‘jog sgom), which settles into direct recognition of mind’s empty nature. Across these dimensions, post-classical Bka’ brgyud thinkers sought a middle way between polarized viewpoints, combining the virtues of each while avoiding the vice of privileging one to the exclusion of the other. David Higgins received his doctorate from the University of Lausanne, Switzerland in 2012. He subsequently held a position as a Post-doc Research Fellow in the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna where he explored the relationship between Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka philosophies in Bka’ brgyud scholasticism during the post-classical period (15th to 16th centuries). His research interests include Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and epistemology with a particular focus on Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā and Rnying ma Rdzogs chen doctrines and practices. His PhD thesis was published under the title Philosophical Foundations of Classical Rdzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes) (Vienna, WSTB no. 78, 2013). His recent publications include Mahāmudrā and the Middle Way: Post-classical Kagyü Discourses on Mind, Emptiness and Buddha Nature (Vienna, WSTB no. 90, 2016, 2 vols.) and Buddha Nature Reconsidered: The Eighth Karma pa’s Middle Path (Vienna, WSTB, 2019, 2 vols.), both of which were co-authored with Martina Drazczyk. David began a translation project with a grant from Tsadra Foundation in 2021. A Conversation on Madhyamaka II Title 2: “The Middle Way Interpretation of the Middle Way” The history of Madhyamaka studies is essentially intertwined with the question of how Madhyamaka is best to be interpreted. The many options than have been proposed can be divided into two groups: those oriented primarily towards an illusionist or nihilist reading, and those tending to some form of realism. The former stress that unenlightened perception of the world is fundamentally afflicted by error, that each notion of existence ordinary beings have inevitably involves the ascription of intrinsic existence, and that intrinsic existence cannot be found either at the conventional or at the ultimate level. The latter stress that we still need to give some account of the distinction between the conventionally true and the conventionally false, the correspondence between language and the world, and Madhyamaka discourse about such notions as ultimate truth, tattva, or tathāta. In this talk I will present some examples of ways of interpreting Madhyamaka belonging to each group, drawing on the history of Indo-Tibetan philosophy and on contemporary studies of Madhyamaka. I will then make some suggestions for the best ways of addressing the tension between the nihilist and the realist readings of Madhyamaka. Jan Westerhoff is Professor of Buddhist Philosophy at Oxford University. His research focuses on the philosophical aspects of the religious traditions of ancient India, particularly the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, and also on contemporary analytic philosophy. His books such as Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka (Oxford University Press, 2009), The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2018), and notably The Non-Existence of the Real World (Oxford University Press, 2020) challenge widespread assumptions in Western metaphysics about substance, intrinsic nature, and the foundations of reality.