欧洲是如何丢掉半导体的？阿斯麦是如何幸存下来的？欧洲最值钱的公司，为什么在自家门口一台机器都卖不掉？东亚半导体八部曲之番外篇｜艾森 Essen

欧洲丢了几乎所有芯片，为什么偏偏留下一个阿斯麦？ 2026 年，阿姆斯特丹的一场辩论会上，阿斯麦管公共事务的一位执行副总裁说了一句话：我们现在在欧洲，什么都没卖出去。这不是修辞。这一年的第一季度和第二季度，阿斯麦卖出去的整机里，欧洲客户占的比例都是零。机器去了韩国，去了台湾地区，去了中国大陆，去了美国。欧洲最值钱的公司，造出了全世界最值钱的机器，可在它自己家门口，没有一家工厂要买。 一年后的同一片天空下，德国东部的马格德堡，政府答应给英特尔的那笔将近一百亿欧元的补贴，一分钱都没有发出去，厂子黄了。而在慕尼黑的另一间办公室里，德累斯顿那家制造内存的工厂，三千多名员工站在总部门口，牌子上写着：别把我们送去见鬼。 「谁想拿纳税人的钱来救企业，自己得先拿出实实在在的、长久的投入。」说这句话的，是当年萨克森州的州长。而那位站在悬崖边上的母公司掌门人回答：市场这么紧张，我们还是愿意提供一笔贷款，还愿意把一大笔股票卖给你们。我们这个方案，已经走到了还能承受的极限。 很多人以为，欧洲是谨慎、不爱赌，所以才活了下来。可这个结论错了一半。欧洲其实赌过，而且赌得很大：1985 年，荷兰和西德联手砸钱造内存，前前后后将近 30 亿马克；1989 年，十几个国家拉起一个联合芯片计划。可他们给自己定的目标，是「在东芝明显领先的情况下，差不多同一时间把产品做出来」——不是更早，也不是更好，是追上。 1990 年，飞利浦换了一位新总裁，上任当天就宣布要亏 20 亿荷兰盾、裁员 1 万人。他砍下的第一刀，就落在半导体上。四年后，欧洲再也没在最先进的芯片上下过同样的重注。 奇怪的是，欧洲唯一坐上全球主桌的那家公司，恰恰是它当年想扔都没扔掉的那一个。1983 年，飞利浦想结束那个一直在亏钱的光刻机小组，找了一圈，没有大公司愿意接手；它最想要的合作方是美国的珀金埃尔默，结果人家转身跟别人合作去了。今天全世界只有它能造的最先进光刻机，当年是飞利浦不得不接下的一个麻烦。 为什么偏偏是它留了下来？为什么日本和欧洲今天站在同一个高度，却是一种是摔下来的、一种是从来没爬上去的？ 今天，我们把日本和欧洲放在一起，算两本账。一笔是越输越加注的账，一笔是输了就离桌、改去给赌场看门的账。 #欧洲半导体 #阿斯麦 #英飞凌 #日本半导体 #奇梦达 Europe lost almost every chip it had. So why did ASML survive? In 2026, at a debate in Amsterdam, a senior executive at ASML said something that sounded like an exaggeration: we have sold absolutely nothing in Europe. It wasn't. In both the first and second quarters of that year, the share of ASML's systems going to European customers was zero. The machines went to Korea, to the Taiwan region, to mainland China, to the United States. Europe's most valuable company built the world's most valuable machine, and no factory at home wanted to buy one. That same year in Magdeburg, in eastern Germany, a subsidy package of nearly ten billion euros that Berlin had promised Intel was never paid out — not a single cent. The fab was cancelled. And in Munich, several thousand workers from the memory plant in Dresden stood outside the parent company's headquarters holding signs that read: don't send us to the devil. "If you expect taxpayers' money to rescue a business, you have to put in something real and lasting of your own first." That was the premier of Saxony. The parent company's answer: in a market this tight, we are still willing to lend, and to sell you a large block of shares. This plan is already at the limit of what we can bear. Most people assume Europe survived because it was cautious — because it never gambled. That is only half true. Europe did gamble, and it gambled big. In 1985 the Netherlands and West Germany poured money into memory chips — nearly three billion marks all told. In 1989, more than a dozen countries launched a joint chip program. But the goal they set themselves was to bring a product to market "at roughly the same time" as Toshiba — not earlier, not better. Just to catch up. In 1990 Philips got a new CEO. On his first day, the company announced a loss of two billion guilders and ten thousand layoffs. The first cut he made landed on semiconductors. After that, Europe never again placed a bet that size on leading-edge chips. Yet the one European company that reached the global top table turned out to be the one Europe tried to throw away and couldn't. In 1983 Philips wanted to shut down its loss-making lithography unit. It looked for a buyer and found none; the partner it actually wanted was Perkin-Elmer, which walked away. The most advanced lithography machine in the world — the only one anyone can build — started life as a nuisance Philips was forced to take on. So why did that one survive? And why do Japan and Europe stand at the same height today, one having fallen from the summit and the other never having climbed it? Today we put Japan and Europe side by side and settle two sets of accounts. One of them doubles down on every loss. The other left the table after a single bad hand and took a job watching the door. #EuropeSemiconductor #ASML #Infineon #JapanSemiconductor #Qimonda 艾森 Essen｜推特 x.com/essen_ai｜油管    / @essenai   Join this channel to get access to perks:    / @essenai