Why China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles Work Simply By Existing

Anti-ship ballistic missiles have fundamentally changed coastal defence in modern naval warfare by enabling precision strikes against fast-moving warships across vast standoff distances. Operating at extreme altitudes before diving back toward high-value targets at hypersonic speeds, these weapons respond to standard defensive measures using maneuverable re-entry vehicles and hypersonic glide vehicles. China’s extensive anti-ship ballistic missile portfolio forms the core of its anti-access and area denial strategy in the Western Pacific, aiming to alter the operational calculus of foreign naval powers and to deter carrier strike groups and aircraft carriers without requiring traditional fleet engagements. This overview analyzes China’s primary anti-ship ballistic missile systems, including the ground-based DF-21D medium-range ballistic missile, the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle, the ship-launched YJ-20, and the air-launched YJ-21. Beyond the individual missile platforms, we explore China’s multi-layered ocean surveillance network. This integrated kill web connects low Earth-orbit synthetic aperture radar satellites, geostationary satellites, high-altitude long-endurance drones, over-the-horizon radars, and maritime surface assets into a resilient targeting architecture. Instead of the Western perception of a fragile kill-chain, this Chinese kill web is much harder to defeat. Finally, the analysis details the strategic consequences for Western naval doctrine, including the US Navy’s transition to Distributed Maritime Operations, radar emission control protocols, extended standoff distances for supercarriers, and the resource trade-offs associated with investing in ballistic missile defense systems.