Behind the Xi-Modi thaw, a larger US-China game

In terms of realpolitik, it is fair to say that the 18th BRICS Summit hosted by New Delhi was really all about whether Communist Party of China General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping would even make it, and then after he did, about the bilateral meeting between him and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For India, this was about sustaining the thaw in bilateral ties for domestic economic reasons and about signalling to the US that it had other friends around the world and could influence those friends. For China, however, Xi’s turning up in New Delhi — after skipping the 2023 G20 summit India hosted — was less about India and primarily about signalling to the US less than two weeks before he embarks on a state visit to Washington, DC. The Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the Summit saw both countries produce their own statement. Comparing the two, there are four noteworthy aspects. One, there is the question of focus. The Chinese statement is longer than the Indian one — the English version is almost thrice as long — but this does not necessarily mean the attention is on India. On the contrary, the Chinese seem to be speaking as much to the Americans as to the Indians. While there is no substantive reference to BRICS in the Indian statement, the Chinese statement has references to “great[er] BRICS cooperation” as well as to the Global South, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the G20. If India was trying to walk a fine line between promoting its strategic autonomy through BRICS and keeping ties with the US on an even keel, China was less concerned about such niceties, using the BRICS shoulder to fire at the US. Two, there is the different order in which each country prioritises bilateral issues. The issue of “peace and tranquility in the border areas” takes up the bulk of the Indian statement. It calls for “for both sides to observe existing agreements and understandings on border related issues”. While the Chinese statement refers to “maintain[ing] peace and tranquility in the border areas” twice, there is not the same level of detailing as it has for people-to-people exchanges and multilateral cooperation. Perhaps this is because the details are available in the “Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus” at the end of the 25th round of talks between the two Special Representatives (SRs) on the boundary question last month.