Why Didn't Japan Just Take the Oil and Leave America Alone? (Japanese Records)

In July 1940, Japan's leaders agreed on a plan for the south. If Japan had to take the oil of the Dutch East Indies by force, the plan said, it would try to limit the enemy to Britain alone. Sixteen months later, Japan's first blow fell on America, at Pearl Harbor. So why didn't Japan just take the oil and leave America alone? Japan's own records do not settle the "what if." But they show that Japan's leaders asked this exact question again and again, and wrote down their answers: a 1940 war game that gave Japan about two years of staying power; a Navy Minister who asked what good the oil fields would be if the oil could not be brought home; a Navy note of March 1941 that said force in the south meant force against America, "absolutely"; the oil arithmetic of June 1941; the American freeze of July 1941; Admiral Nagano telling the Emperor that Japan had two years of oil and it would be "better to strike now," and that he was not sure Japan could win at all; Marquis Kido's own analysis of why the Indies could not be taken without America; the deadline set at the Imperial Conference of September 6; Admiral Yamamoto's warning against "a war with so little chance of success"; and the reasons Japan chose early December. Japan's records explain why its leaders decided as they did. They do not justify the war, or Japan's war in China and its move into Indochina that led to the embargo. All times and dates are Tokyo time, as in the Japanese records. CHAPTERS 0:00 Introduction: Not America 1:56 Two Years 4:21 Britain Alone 6:56 The Map 9:29 If the Oil Stops 12:26 The Freeze 15:21 Better to Strike Now 18:32 The Deadline 21:48 Little Chance 24:56 So, Why Not Just Take the Oil? MAIN SOURCES Senshi Sosho (Japanese official war history), vol. 101: Daihon'ei Kaigunbu: Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii, part 2 (the Navy General Staff and the road to war, 1940–1941). Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu, 1979. Including quotations from the Army's secret war diary, Marquis Kido's diary, the records of the liaison conferences and Imperial Conferences, and later testimony. On the American side: the freeze of July 26, 1941 and how it became a total oil embargo in practice (Irvine H. Anderson, 1975; Edward S. Miller, "Bankrupting the Enemy," 2007); Lord Halifax's report of his conversation with President Roosevelt on December 1, 1941. Japanese text shown on screen is quoted from the records named above. English translations are by this channel. Map terrain: Terrain Tiles (Mapzen / Linux Foundation). Photographs: U.S. Navy (80-G and NH series), U.S. National Archives, Library of Congress (Farm Security Administration), Imperial War Museums, and Japanese photographs taken before 1946. Narration uses a synthetic voice.