Seminario de investigadores • Ram Neta

"A Puzzle about Reason and the Emotions" Dr. Ram Neta [UNC Chapel Hill] Modera: Dr. Miguel Ángel Rotter [Estudiante asociado en el IIFs] Abstract Suppose you are angry at Maria for insulting you. In such a case, it appears that Maria's insulting you is a reason for you to be angry at her. Now, according to a widely held view in the philosophy of mind, R can be your reason for F'ing only if R can be a premise from which you can reason to F'ing. But anger can never be the conclusion of a line of reasoning. Something has to give, but what? Some philosophers (e.g., Olivie Bailey, Rachel Achs) argue that anger can be the conclusion of a line of reasoning. Other philosophers (e.g., Conner Schulz) argue that you can never have a. reason for being angry. In this paper, I criticize both of these views, and argue instead against the bridge principle that R can be your reason for F'ing only if R can be a premise from which you reason to F'ing. There are two different ways in which reasons can guide our attitudes, and reasoning is only one of them. This point is crucial to understanding what's distinctive about the emotions. Proyecto “Subdeterminación y justificación” (SECIHTI IH-2025-I-126)