Oral Argument on religious exemptions in preschool funding: St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcripts
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Oral Argument on religious exemptions in preschool funding: St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
3 096 просмотров · 1 дн. назад
Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcripts
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3 096 просмотров · 1 дн. назад
Oral argument audio (including transcript) of case
[25-581] St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
argued at the Supreme Court of the United States on Nov 3, 2026.
More information about the case:
Justia: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/fede...
Docket: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/d...
Oyez.org: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2026/25-581
Case information based on oyez.org, licensed under a CC-BY-NC License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/....
Not affiliated with oyez.org or the Supreme Court.
Argued on Nov 3, 2026.
Petitioner: St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado
Respondent: Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood
Advocates:
Nicholas R. Reaves (for the Petitioners)
Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)
Helen Norton (for the Respondents)
Chapters
0:00:00 Nicholas R. Reaves
0:47:53 Sarah M. Harris
1:17:27 Helen Norton
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Colorado’s universal preschool program funds public and private providers that agree to nondiscrimination requirements, including protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. Two Catholic parishes and the Archdiocese of Denver challenged those requirements, arguing that they conflict with religious admissions policies. They contended that the program’s enrollment preferences and temporary waivers allow exceptions for secular interests while denying religious accommodation. The district court denied their request to block the requirements, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The challengers sought Supreme Court review.
Question
Does the Free Exercise Clause require unrestricted discretion or secular exemptions before a law loses general applicability? Does its protection against excluding religious institutions from public benefits extend beyond explicit participation bans?